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Kentucky Law Survey
Corporations
By WILLBURT D. HAM*
Following the pattern used in previous Surveys,' Part I of
this article will be devoted to a discussion of continuing devel-
opments in corporation law at the federal level, including an
aborted attempt to obtain from the Supreme Court of the
United States further clarification of the scope and meaning of
the purchaser-seller standing requirement for plaintiffs in rule
10b-5 cases. Part II will be devoted to a discussion of selected
developments in state corporation law with particular empha-
sis on two recent Delaware cases relating to minority "freeze-
outs" in merger transactions.
I. FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW
A. Standing to Sue
Litigation under rule 10b-5,2 which was promulgated by
the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to author-
ity granted to it in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 19343 and which broadly condemns fraudulent and deceptive
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S. 1937, J.D. 1940, University of
Illinois; LL.M. 1941, Harvard University.
For previous corporation law surveys, see Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-
Corporations, 66 KY. L.J. 477 (1978); Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations,
65 Ky. L.J. 256 (1976); Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations, 64 Ky. L.J. 253
(1975); Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations, 63 Ky. L.J. 739 (1975).
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
3 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). The section reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
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practices in the purchase or sale of securities,' continues to
proliferate in the lower federal courts, despite recent restrictive
interpretations by the Supreme Court of the United States as
to the scope of the rule.' One of the key restraints long imposed
on persons bringing rule 10b-5 suits has been that the plaintiffs
in such suits must be purchasers or sellers of a security.6 This
purchaser-seller standing requirement, known as the
Birnbaum rule, had its origin in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp.,7 decided by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in 1952. It was not until twenty-three years later that the Su-
preme Court of the United States, in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores,8 confirmed the validity of the Birnbaum
standing requirement. During the intervening years between
Birnbaum and Blue Chip Stamps, the lower federal courts,
while generally voicing approval of the Birnbaum rule,9 had
softened its impact either by giving expansive interpretations
to the terms "purchase" and "sale," 10 or by recognizing out-
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors.
The full text of the rule reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necesssary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
1 See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
1 This restriction stems from language in § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 which requires
that the conduct prohibited be "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a security.
See notes 3 and 4 supra.
7 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
8 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
1 Only one Circuit, the Seventh, rejected the rule outright. See Eason v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
(1974).
to See, e.g., James v. Gerber Prod. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973) (beneficiary
of trust treated as seller of stock even though actual sale of the stock had been by the
trustee); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970
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right exceptions to the application of the rule." In Blue Chip
Stamps the Supreme Court of the United States expressed its
concern as to such "case-by-case erosion" of the Birnbaum
rule,' 2 and rejected the position which had been taken by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that non-purchaser
plaintiffs who claimed that they had been induced not to pur-
chase securities of Blue Chip Stamps under an antitrust con-
sent decree giving them that right could be likened to persons
owning contractual rights to buy or sell securities. 3 The Su-
preme Court spoke of the need for "a straight forward applica-
tion of the Birnbaum rule."
14
Much of the commentary since the Blue Chip Stamps de-
cision has been devoted to a consideration of the continued
vitality of the "extensions" and "exceptions" to the Birnbaum
rule. 5 Such speculation has made it evident that there exists
a need for further clarification from the Supreme Court as to
the strictness with which the Court expects the purchaser-
seller standing requirement to be applied."6 It appeared for a
time that such clarification might be forthcoming when, during
1977, the Supreme Court agreed to review the decision of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in MaItis v. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp.'7 The court of appeals there held, among other
things, that a pledgee of stock could be considered a
(1967) (shareholder of corporation treated as "forced" seller when as result of a merger
his only choices were to accept the cash payment offered under the merger or seek the
cash value of his stock through the state appraisal remedy).
11 See, e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967)
(standing requirement not applicable to suits for injunctive relief).
,1 421 U.S. at 755.
,3 Id. at 751.
" Id. at 755.
"s See, e.g., Jacobs, Standing to Sue Under lOb-5 After Blue Chip Stamps, 3 SEC.
REG. L.J. 387 (1976); Note, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores: The Future of
Standing Under Rule 10b-5, 61 IowA L. REv. 497 (1975); The Purchaser-Seller Rule is
Adopted by the Supreme Court, 1 J. CoR'. L. 444 (1976).
16 while the tone of the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Rehnquist in the
Blue Chip Stamps case suggests a spartan approach to the standing requirement, the
policy considerations which he emphasized of deterring vexatious suits and eliminating
the dangers of uncorroborated oral testimony might leave open the possibility of recog-
nizing more "discrete" groups of plaintiffs when these policy considerations would not
be affected.
17 568 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted sub. nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis,
431 U.S. 928 (1977).
1978-79]
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"purchaser" of such stock for purposes of section 10(b) and rule
10b-5.:
In the Mallis case, stock in Equity National Industries,
Inc. had been pledged to Mallis and Kupferman as security for
a loan of money needed to purchase the securities. At the time
of the loan, the certificates for this stock were in the possession
of Bankers Trust Co. as pledgee under another previous loan
made to the sellers of the stock. The stock was subject to an
escrow agreement under which Equity National could recall
the stock for cancellation under certain stated conditions.1 8
Upon notice to Bankers Trust, Equity National did recall the
stock for cancellation. Despite the fact that this made the stock
worthless, Bankers Trust nevertheless released the Equity Na-
tional certificates to the sellers upon payment of the remaining
amount due from the sellers under their loan. The sellers then
transferred the Equity National certificates to the purchasers
who in turn delivered them to Mallis and Kupferman pursuant
to the loan agreement.
The loan made by Mallis and Kupferman to the purchas-
ers not being repaid, Mallis and Kupferman brought a damage
suit against Bankers Trust charging that Bankers Trust had
violated the Securities Act of 1933 in disposing of unregistered
Equity National shares when terminating their pledge agree-
ment with the former owners of the stock. 9 During the course
of the proceedings in the district court, Mallis and Kupferman
sought to amend their complaint against Bankers Trust so as
to charge a violation of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule
10b-5 thereunder. The theory under the 1934 Act was that
Bankers Trust had knowingly misrepresented the status of the
Equity National certificates under the escrow agreement."0
" The sellers had acquired their shares in Equity National as the result of a
merger between a corporation they controlled and Equity National. The escrow agree-
ment required the return of these certificates to Equity National for cancellation or
reissue if the acquired corporation did not meet certain specified earnings conditions.
568 F.2d at 826.
" Section 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 makes a seller of a security liable to
his immediate purchaser if he offers or sells such security through the channels of
interstate commerce without having complied with the registration and prospectus
provisions of § 5 of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77(1) (1976). Although other Equity National
shares of the same series were registered under the 1933 Act, the particular shares
issued to the sellers were not so registered. 568 F.2d at 826.
1 568 F.2d at 830. Mallis and Kupferman also asserted a claim against Franklin
[Vol. 67
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The district court dismissed the claim under the 1933 Act
and refused to allow Mallis and Kupferman to amend their
complaint to assert their claim under the 1934 Act on the
ground that, as pledgees, they were not "purchasers" of securi-
ties and therefore had no standing to bring their suit under
either of the Acts.2 ' On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed the decision of the district court on the
1934 Act claim, holding that a pledge constitutes a "contract
to sell or otherwise dispose of" a security within the meaning
of section 3(a)(14) of the 1934 Act.2 The court treated Mallis
and Kupferman as purchasers by virtue of their acceptance of
the pledge from the borrowers and treated Bankers Trust as a
seller by virtue of its release of the securities under the previous
pledge to it by the sellers of the securities.? Thus, there was
both a "purchase" and a "sale" for purposes of rule 10b-5. 21 The
court of appeals saw no conflict in this position with the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps.2 Referring to
the concern expressed by the Supreme Court in that case as to
the need for "an objectively demonstrable fact," such as an
acquisition or disposition of securities, to corroborate plaintiffs'
claims,216 the court of appeals remarked that "[a] pledge which
National Bank from whom they had borrowed the funds to make their loan to the
purchasers of the Equity National stock charging that the loan violated the margin
requirements of Regulation U of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Id. at 826-27. Franklin National Bank had become insolvent and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, as receiver, was named as a defendant on the Regulation U
claim. Id. at 826 n.2. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal by the district court
of the Regulation U claim. Id. at 830.
21 Id. at 827.
22 Id. at 830. Section 3(a)(14) of the 1934 Act defines the term "sale" to "include
any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of' securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1976).
In reaching its result under the 1934 Act the court of appeals placed heavy reliance
on two of its earlier decisions under the 1933 Act in which it had held a pledge consti-
tuted a "sale" within the meaning of § 2(3) of the 1933 Act which defines a "sale" to
include "every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for
value." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1976). See United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976); SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 819 (1960).
21 568 F.2d at 830.
11 Id. at 829. The term "purchase" is as broadly defined in the 1934 Act as the
term "sale." Section 3(a)(13) of the Act provides: "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each
include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13)
(1976).
568 F.2d at 829.
421 U.S. at 743.
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occurs pursuant to a loan contract is just as concrete a transac-
tion as is a normal transfer of title."27
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Matlis
case, it appeared that the Court was ready to provide further
clarification of its opinion in Blue Chip Stamps regarding the
standing requirement, but unfortunately that opportunity was
lost when, after oral argument, the Court decided certiorari
had been improvidently granted.2s On oral argument plaintiffs'
counsel had taken the position that release of a pledge was not
a sale and had urged that the judgment of the court of appeals
be affirmed on a different theory than that used by the court
of appeals in reaching its decision.2 Under these conditions the
Supreme Court refused to review the standing issue on the
merits. Due, therefore, to a procedural quirk, the corporate
world must now wait once again for the clarification it has been
seeking as to the scope of the standing requirement under sec-
tion 10(b) and rule 10b-5 since Blue Chip Stamps.
B. Plaintiff's Due Diligence
After recognition of the private cause of action under sec-
tion 10(b) and rule 10b-5,30 there followed the need to establish
21 568 F.2d at 829 (footnote omitted). In contrast with the opinion of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in Mallis, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held
that a pledge of securities to secure a commercial bank loan is not a "purchase" of a
security within the meaning of the securities laws. National Bank of Commerce v. All
Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1978).
= Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1978).
2 Id. at 388.
' Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act contains no express civil liability provisions.
However, in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), Judge
Kirkpatrick, federal district judge for the°Eastern District of Pennsylvania, thought
that one could be implied to enforce the duties created by the section. It was not until
1971 that the Supreme Court of the United States acknowledged the existence of such
a private remedy in Superintendant of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13
n.9 (1971). The Supreme Court cited in support of its position an earlier similar
decision under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act involving the federal proxy rules. J. I. Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). The Court had there found the basis for implying the
existence of a private cause of action in the language of § 14(a), which authorizes the
Securities and Exchange Commission to adopt such rules and regulations governing
the use of proxies as may be "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). The Court remarked that "[w]hile
this language makes no specific reference to a private right of action, among its chief
purposes is 'the protection of investors,' which certainly implies the availability of
judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result." 377 U.S. at 432. Although §
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the elements requisite to the maintenance of such actions.
Three basic elements emerged: scienter, materiality, and reli-
ance. The Supreme Court of the United States has spoken as
to each of these elements. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,31 the
Court held that a private cause of action for damages under
rule 10b-5 would not lie absent an allegation of scienter, which
the Court described as an "intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud."32 In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,3 the,
Court adopted the position under the federal proxy rules34 that
10(b) contains similar language and thus by parity of reasoning would appear to justify
the implication of a private civil remedy, there is evidence in the legislative history of
§ 10(b) that Congress was only thinking in terms of creating a Commission enforce-
ment tool rather than a private civil remedy. See Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule
10b-5: Judicial Revision of the Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1962).
3' 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
" Id. at 193. While the Court made it clear in Hochfelder that it was rejecting a
negligence standard of conduct for defendants under § 10(b) and rule 10b(5), the Court
failed to clarify the exact nature of the "scienter" requirement. The Court remarked
that "the term 'scienter' refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipu-
late, or defraud." Id. at 194 n.12. However, the Court did not make clear whether
"knowing" conduct as well as "intentional" conduct would supply the "mental state"
required to produce the needed "scienter" for purposes of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. At
one point the Court spoke of the words "manipulative or deceptive" used in connection
with "device or contrivance" in § 10(b) as strongly suggesting that § 10(b) was in-
tended to proscribe "knowing or intentional misconduct." Id. at 197. At another point
in the opinion, however, in speaking of the significance of the word "manipulative,"
the Court remarked that "[it connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to
deceive or defraud investors. . . ." Id. at 199 (emphasis added). But, again, in speak-
ing of the express civil liability provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the Court re-
marked that Congress in each instance clearly specified whether recovery was to be
premised on "knowing or intentional conduct, negligence, or entirely innocent mis-
take." Id. at 207. And, earlier in its opinion, in speaking of the legislative history of §
10(b), the Court had said that "we think the relevant portions of that history support
our conclusion that § 10(b) was addressed to practices that involve some element of
scienter. . . ." Id. at 201. Although not entirely clear, most of these statements by
the Court would seem to suggest a willingness to treat "knowing" conduct as within
the scienter requirement. As to reckless conduct, the Court made it clear that it was
leaving that issue open, saying: "We need not address here the question whether, in
some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5." Id. at 194 n.12. See generally, Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to
Define Scienter Under Rule 10b-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REv. 213
(1977).
(7 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
" Rule 14a-9(a) of these rules provides:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any
proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication,
written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in light of
1978-791
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"[an omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likeli-
hood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it impor-
tant" in making his voting decisions. 5 And, in Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States,6 the Court held that where a rule
10b-5 claim was based on a failure to disclose, positive proof
of reliance was unnecessary but would be presumed upon a
showing of the materiality of the withheld information.37
In addition to the elements of scienter, materiality, and
reliance which must be met by a plaintiff to establish a cause
of action under rule 10b-5, there has emerged a fourth element
consisting of a requirement of due diligence on the part of the
plaintiff in protecting his own interests.38 The due diligence
requirement has been treated by some courts as a separate
element in rule 10b-5 cases. 9 Other courts have treated it as a
part of the reliance requirement, placing a responsiblity on the
plaintiff to show that the reliance was justifiable." The deci-
the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect
to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in
order to make the statements therein not false or misleading ....
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1978).
u 426 U.S. at 449. By adopting the position that for an omitted fact to be material
the test should be whether the omitted fact would affect the attitude of the reasonable
investor, the Court settled a conflict that had developed in the lower federal courts over
whether the test should be whether the omitted fact would affect the attitude of the
reasonable investor or whether it should only be whether such omitted fact might affect
the attitude of such investor. The "might" test had been adopted by the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in the TSC Industries case. Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus.,
Inc., 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975).
31 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
The Court said:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to
disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that
is necessary is that the facts withheld be material . . . . This obligation to
disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the requisite ele-
ment of causation in fact.
Id. at 153-54.
u' See Wheeler, Plaintiff's Duty of Due Care Under Rule 10b-5: An Implied De-
fense to an Implied Remedy, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 561 (1975).
31 See Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
41 See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 103 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). A third approach to the due diligence requirement has
been to take the plaintiff's conduct into account in measuring the extent of the defen-
dant's duty under rule 10b-5. See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit used a "flexible duty" standard for measur-
ing the conduct of defendants in rule 10b-5 cases and noted:
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sion of the Supreme Court in Hochfelder, however, has made
it necessary to re-examine the due diligence requirement to
determine if it continues to have any relevancy in light of that
decision making defendants liable in rule 10b-5 cases only on
the basis of intentional conduct." Many of the pre-Hochfelder
cases discussed the due diligence requirement in the context of
negligent conduct on the part of the defendants where the tort
analogy of contributory negligence as a defense to negligent
conduct gave support to the due diligence requirement." The
[Mie feel the court should, in instructing on a defendant's duty under
rule 10b-5, require the jury to consider the relationship of the defendant to
the plaintiff, the defendant's access to the information as compared to the
plaintiff's access, the benefit that the defendant derives from the relation-
ship, the defendant's awareness of whether the plaintiff was relying upon
their relationship in making his investment decisions and the defendant's
activity in initiating the securities transaction in question.
495 F.2d at 735-36 (footnotes omitted). In support of this approach to liability under
rule 10b-5, see Campbell, Elements of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: Scienter, Reliance,
and Plaintiff's Reasonable Conduct Requirement, 26 S. C. L. REV. 653 (1975).
" One of the justifications cited for the due diligence requirement is the encour-
agement of investor diligence in stock transactions. See Note, The Due Diligence
Requirement for Plaintiffs Under Rule 10b-5, 1975 DuKE L.J. 753, 760-61. If this is the
true basis for the requirement, then there would seem to be considerable merit in
treating due diligence as a separate distinct requirement in rule 10b-5 cases. Other-
wise, to make it a part of the reliance requirement results in due diligence ceasing to
be a relevant factor in omission cases under the opinion of the Supreme Court in
Affiliated Ute Citizens, which presumes reliance in such cases upon a showing of
materiality. As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals said in Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d
1005 (5th Cir. 1977):
When due care is discussed in terms of reliance, then, the misrepresentation-
omission distinction could remove from plaintiffs the responsiblity of exercis-
ing due care to protect their interest in omission cases. If reliance never
becomes an issue, in other words, a court will have no basis to assess the
justifiability of that reliance.
Id. at 1015-16. Another persuasive argument for treating due diligence as a separate
element of a rule 10b-5 case is that reliance and due diligence are conceptually differ-
ent. As has been observed:
Reliance considers whether the plaintiff was in fact influenced in his invest-
ment decision by the untrue statements or omission of the defendant. But
whether the plaintiff was in fact influenced by the untrue statements or
omissions is wholly irrelevant to whether the plaintiff should have been
influenced. The latter question is best answered by determining whether or
not the plaintiff exercised due care to protect his own interests under the
circumstances.
Wheeler, supra note 38, at 592 (footnote omitted).
42 See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRS § 108, at 716 (4th ed. 1971);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 552A (1977).
1978-79]
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tort analogy, however, breaks down if the due diligence require-
ment is applied to cases of intentional conduct since contribu-
tory negligence has not generally been considered a bar to an
intentional tort under tort law."
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify the rele-
vancy of the due diligence requirement under Hochfelder when
requested to review the Fifth Circuit decision in Dupuy v.
Dupuy." However, the Court denied certiorari," despite a
strong dissent by Mr. Justice White. In the Dupuy case, Milton
Dupuy charged that his brother, Clarence, had intentionally
misrepresented the value of stock held by Milton in a corpora-
tion jointly owned by the two of them. A jury awarded damages
to Milton, finding, in answer to a special interrogatory, that
Milton had exercised due diligence in making the sale of his
stock to his brother. The trial judge granted a motion by Clar-
ence Dupuy for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the
ground that he did not believe that there was any evidence to
support a finding of due diligence on the part of Milton." On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the
judgment n.o.v., holding that a negligence standard for plain-
tiffs in rule 10b-5 cases was inappropriate in light of
Hochfelder.47 The court said: "We consider Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder prompts a change in the law of due diligence, as it
is applicable in 10b-5 cases. Both tort law and federal securities
policy support imposing on the plaintiff only a standard of care
not exceeding that imposed on the defendant.""
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Holdsworth
v. Strong" adopted a similar position with regard to the due
diligence requirement after Hochfelder, observing that "[i]f
plaintiff must prove scienter and at the same time the defen-
dant is allowed to defend on this basis [lack of due diligence
11 See W. PROSSER, supra note 42, at 716.
" 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1977).
45 434 U.S. 911 (1977).
46 551 F.2d at 1008.
47 Id.
41 Id. at 1020. The court also noted the diminished need for the due diligence
requirement as a limiting factor on the potential scope of liability in rule 10b-5 cases
as a result of Hochfelder imposing liability only on a showing of scienter on the part
of the defendant. Id. at 1019.
49 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
[Vol. 67
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by plaintiff], the general effect on the remedy is of great mag-
nitude and the action lies only in an extraordinary case." 50
Nevertheless, there have been cases since Hochfelder that have
continued to apply the due diligence standard to rule 10b-5
plaintiffs.' This continuing conflict in the case law provoked
Justice White's dissent in the Dupuy case when certiorari was
denied. His remarks summarize well the need for further clari-
fication by the Supreme Court of the status of the due diligence
requirement after Hochfelder:
The Court should take this opportunity to clarify the
standard of care expected of plaintiffs in litigation under Rule
10b-5. Business can be transacted more freely and efficiently
if the responsiblity for verifying underlying facts is clearly
allocated. Because securities litigation can be complex and
expensive, it should be avoided to the maximum extent by
early clarification of the ground rules. This Court should thus
promptly resolve the existing uncertainty as to the proper
standard of care required of plaintiffs after Ernst & Ernst.52
C. Damages
A recent case from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Nelson v. Serwold,53 illustrates one of the newer issues coming
to the forefront in rule 10b-5 damage suits, now that more such
suits are proceeding to final judgment." This issue relates to
Id. at 693.
" See Hirsch v. duPont, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977). In Straub v. Vaisman & Co.,
540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, taking into account
the effects of Hochfelder. nevertheless preserved the due diligence requirement but
placed the burden of proof as to the due care issue on the defense. Similarly, in McLean
v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), the District Court for the Southern
District of New York assumed that the due diligence requirement still applied to
situations involving knowing and reckless conduct even after Hochfelder saying:
"There is, however, a wide spectrum of prohibited behavior between negligence and
specific intent to defraud. In that uncharted land of knowing and reckless misconduct,
defendant should be entitled to contest liability by asserting a due diligence defense."
420 F. Supp. at 1078. See generally Comment, Due Care: Still a Limitation on lOb-5
Recovery?, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 122 (1977).
52 434 U.S. at 912.
576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1978).
s5 Many of the early cases considered by the courts were concerned only with
whether the complaint alleged a cause of action under rule 10b-5. See. e.g., SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), in which the court remarked at
the outset of its opinion: "Pursuant to a stipulation by all parties, the question of the
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the test to be used in measuring the damages to be awarded in
such suits.
The initial approach to the computation of damages was
to use the tort theory of out-of-pocket loss." This approach,
however, was frequently supplemented by use of the doctrine
of cover." The now well-known Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation
provides a good example of this method of computing damages
in private damage suits.57 One facet of that litigation involved
a suit brought in federal district court by three Utah sharehold-
ers of Texas Gulf Sulphur who claimed that they had suffered
loss when led to sell their TGS stock as a result of a press
release published by the company which they charged was false
and misleading. The district court, finding the press release
to have been intentionally deceptive," said that "[t]he aim of
courts in cases of this type is to put the plaintiffs in the posi-
tions they would have been in if they had not been motivated
by defendants' fraudulent press release to sell their stock."60
The court pointed out that the common-law rule in trover for
conversion of ordinary chattels based on the fair market value
of the chattels at the time of conversion had been found inap-
propriate in the case of corporate shares with rapidly changing
values."1 The court said that the rule which had evolved was
that the measure of damages in stock transactions should be
"the highest intermediate value reached by the stock between
the time of the wrongful act complained of and a reasonable
appropriate remedies to be applied was deferred pending a final determination whether
the defendants or any of them had violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5'and therefore
that question is not now before us." Id. at 839 n.1.
See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, JR., SECUerrIES REGULATION 1086 (4th ed. 1977).
"Id.
This litigation resulted from a suit instituted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1965 charging Texas Gulf Sulphur (now Texas Gulf) and a number of
its officers and employees with violations of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 in failing to ade-
quately disclose information pertaining to a spectacular ore discovery near Timmons,
Ontario, in northern Canada. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968). For instructive accounts of this fascinating corporate story see K. PATRICK,
PERPETUAL JEOPARDY, THE TEXAS GULF SULPHUR AFFAIR: A CHRONICLE OF ACHIEVEMENT
AND MISADVANTURE (1972); M. SCHULMAN, THE BILLION DOLLAR WINDFALL (1970).
"Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548 (D.C. Utah 1970).
" The court characterized the press release as "misleading, intentionally decep-
tive, inaccurate and knowingly deficient in material facts . . . ... Id. at 562.
"Id.
5, Id. at 563.
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time after the injured party received, or should have received
notice of it, a time within which he has a reasonable opportun-
ity to replace the stock.""2 The court computed the damages in
the TGS case on this basis." On appeal, this approach to the
computation of damages was affirmed. 4
In the Nelson case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, while recognizing that the law in this area still remains
in a somewhat confused state due to the newness of the ques-
tion, noted a developing trend in defrauded seller cases to
award damages based on defendant's profits rather than on
plaintiff's losses." This approach to computing damages was
articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Affiliated Ute Citizens,6 a defrauded seller case, 7 when the
Court said:
In our view, the correct measure of damages under § 28
of the Act ... is the difference between the fair value of all
that the . . .seller received and the fair value of what he
would have received had there been no fraudulent conduct,
62 Id.
"The court decided that a reasonable period for allowing plaintiffs to replace
their stock would be a 20-day trading period starting with the date on which the
company had announced its ore discovery to the public. The court took the average of
all the highest market prices on the 20 trading days and arrived at an average price of
$50.75. By deducting from this figure the price at which the plaintiffs sold their shares
and multiplying by the number of shares, the court determined the loss. Id. at 565.
" Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971). The court of appeals approved the general approach taken by the
district court to the award of damages but modified the actual award somewhat by
deleting the averaging aspect of the award, treating the date for beginning the cover
period as four days from the date of the public announcement of the ore discovery, and
treating a nine-day period thereafter as a reasonable period to permit one to "cover"
by reinvestment. Id. at 105. The court went on to say that whether a reasonable time
was an added nine trading days, which to them seemed more reasonable in the circum-
stances, or the 17 additional trading days imposed by the trial court was actually
irrelevant to the award, since in either event the highest value (at $59) was achieved
prior to the expiration of either time limit. Id.
11 576 F.2d at 1338. See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 879 (1965).
" Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
" In this case, two employees of the First Security Bank of Utah devised a scheme
whereby they would induce members of the Ute Indian tribe to sell their stock in Ute
Development Corporation, a management corporation created to manage property
distributable to members of the tribe, to the employees or other non-Indians at prices
below the worth of the stock, the purchasers then making a profit by resale of the stock
on a secondary market created for that purpose.
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• . .except for the situation where the defendant received
more than the seller's actual loss. In the latter case damages
are the amount of the defendant's profit.68
In Nelson, plaintiff, owner of thirty-six shares of stock in
Poulsbo Rural Telephone Association, a corporation organized
under the laws of the State of Washington, sold these shares
to defendant, Serwold, at $5 per share on the assumption that
this represented the fair market value of the stock. 9 Plaintiff
charged that Serwold had failed to reveal to him at the time
of the sale that Serwold was a participant in a "control group"
which owned fifty-six percent of the telephone company's stock
and which had formulated long-range plans for modernizing
the company and selling it.7" A sale of Poulsbo Telephone did
actually take place several years later to United Utilities, Inc.,
an Oregon company. Poulsbo Telephone exchanged its assets
for United stock, the Poulsbo shareholders receiving twenty-
five shares of United stock having a value of $500 for each share
of Poulsbo stock. 7'
The district court found defendant (the Serwold group) to
be in violation of rule 10b-5 and awarded damages of $3,003.48
($83.43 per share) to plaintiff based on the highest value the
shares had reached a reasonable time after the transaction.
72
The court of appeals, while approving the determination of
liability,73 reversed on the damage question remanding the case
" 406 U.S. at 155. Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act provides that "no person permit-
ted to maintain a suit for damages ... shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment
in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of
the act complained of." 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976).
,1 576 F.2d at 1334-35.
71 Id. at 1334.
1' Id. at 1335.
72 Id. at 1338.
3 The district court had concluded that the evidence did not justify a finding that
the defendants 'deliberately and cold-bloodedly set out to conceal information which
10b-5 requires to be provided."' Id. at 1337. The court of appeals pointed out that while
this language would suggest lack of willfulness or aggravated intent on the part of
defendants, there was sufficient evidence to indicate that the defendants' omissions
were at least with knowledge. Id. at 1337. This, the court felt, was sufficient to satisfy
the scienter requirement established in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, which the court
interpreted to include knowing conduct as well as intentional conduct. The court said:
"Ernst & Ernst, we think, only went so far as to eliminate negligence as a basis for
liability. We agree with those courts which have found that Congress intended the
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for assessment of damages based on a "profit" measure of re-
covery rather than a "loss" measure of recovery.7' The court
noted that defendant Serwold's profit was approximately $495
per share, representing the difference between the $5 per share
paid for the Poulsbo stock and the $500 worth of United stock
received for each share of Poulsbo stock, as compared to plain-
tiff's loss at the time of the transaction of approximately $55
per share based on the difference in its book value at that time
of $60 per share and the $5 received for each share on the sale
of the stock to defendant. 75 The court determined that the date
for computing the profit should be the date of the disclosure of
the fraud.76 Since the sale of Poulsbo Telephone's assets to
United precipitated the discovery of the fraud, the court be-
lieved that defendant's profits should be based on what they
derived from that sale.
77
Defendant argued that to use such a long period of time
(several years) for computing profits was unduly harsh and
that the "profit" theory of recovery should be confined to cases
of conscious misrepresentations as opposed to cases of mere
omissions. 7 The court replied that it saw "no harshness in a
ambit of § 10(b) to reach a broad category of behavior, including knowing or reckless
conduct." Id.
T, Id. at 1340.
7' Id. at 1339 n.4. The court mentioned a second check from Serwold increasing
the price paid for plaintiff's stock to $6.94 per share but the court seems to have
disregarded this increase in computing defendant's profit or plaintiffs loss. Id. at 1335.
7, Id. at 1340. Under the disgorgement theory, the date of disclosure of the fraud
is generally used instead of the date of judgment which theoretically might be the more
appropriate date since the aim behind the disgorgement theory in awarding defen-
dant's profits to plaintiff is to return the seller to the position he would have been in
had the sale not taken place. See Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases
Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. Ray. 371, 372 (1974). When the
Commission case in the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation was sent back to the district
court for the determination of the relief to be granted, Judge Dudley Bonsal adopted
a similar formula for determining the profits to be returned by the individual defen-
dants who had unlawfully traded in TGS stock. He computed the profits on the basis
of the difference between the price of the stock at the time of purchase by the individ-
ual defendants and the mean average price of the stock on the market the day after
TGS made its public announcement. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp.
77, 93 (1970). His method of computing the profits was affirmed on appeal. SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971). See generally Ellsworth,
Disgorgement in Securities Fraud Actions Brought by the SEC, 1977 DuKE L.J. 641.
7 576 F.2d at 1340.
"1 Id. at 1339. The court saw no reason to distinguish between misrepresentations
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remedy which takes from a fraudulent actor what was gener-
ated by his conduct," 9 adding that the "profit" rule "provides
full compensation for injury caused by fraudulent conduct,
and, significantly, it removes all incentive to engage in such
conduct. '8° This latter statement by the court would appear to
add a punitive dimension to liability under rule 10b-5 and is
reminiscent of a similar statement made by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in regard to the determination of "profits
realized" under section 16(b) of the 1934 Act dealing with stock
trading by corporate insiders.8 ' The court there referred to the
need to adopt a measure of recovery that would "squeeze all
possible profits out of stock transactions" in order to carry out
the deterrent purposes of the section.2 The opinion of the court
in Nelson seems to reflect a similar attitude toward recovery
in rule 10b-5 litigation.
HT. ' STATE CORPORATION LAW
A. Corporate "freeze-outs"
A problem that has caused particular concern in corporate
circles in recent years has been the frequency with which ma-
jority interests in a corporation have used merger procedures
permitted by state corporation statutes to "cash-out" minority
interests. 3 This concern was heightened when the Supreme
Court of the United States held, in Santa Fe Industries v.
Green,4 that a merger accomplished in accordance with the
based on affirmations and those based on omission, commenting that "[e]ither kind
of misrepresentation is a means by which one can defraud another, and an omission
can be as intentional as an affirmation." Id.
79 Id.
' Id. at 1338 (footnote omitted).
s' Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1943). While it is true that
§ 28(a) of the 1934 Act limits recovery in damage actions to "actual damages" and thus
precludes an award of "punitive damages," this still leaves a wide margin for the
determination of what constitutes "actual damages." See 4 A. BROMBERG, SECurrmIs
LAW: FRAUD, SEC RULE lOb-5 § 9.1 (1977).
81 136 F.2d at 239.
8 See Comment, Corporate Freeze-outs Effected by Merger: The Search for a
Rule, 37 U. Prrr. L. REv. 115 (1975). For a general discussion of corporate "freeze-outs"
in the context of "going private" transactions, see Borden, Going Private-Old Tort,
New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 987 (1974).
s4 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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provisions of the Delaware short-form merger statute could not
be challenged under rule 10b-5 by minority shareholders on the
ground that the merger served no justifiable business purpose
and was intended solely to eliminate the minority from the
corporation. 5 The Court stressed that rule 10b-5 was essen-
tially a "disclosure" rule and not a "fairness" rule,8 and that,
since the terms of the merger had been fully disclosed to the
shareholders of the corporation, the minority shareholders were
relegated to their remedies under state law.17 Since the typical
state law remedy available to minority shareholders objecting
to a merger has been the statutory appraisal remedy providing
for payment to them of the fair value of their shares, " this has
meant that as a result of the decision in Green minority share-
holders have had little, if any, protection against being forced
out of their equity participation in the enterprise. "9
Two recent Delaware cases have offered some hope that
state law may yet fill this "gap" in the protection of minority
interests. 0 In the first of these cases, Singer v. Magnavox Co.,9
the Supreme Court of Delaware held that a merger accom-
u Id. The Court remarked that "[t]here may well be a need for uniform federal
fiduciary standards to govern mergers such as that challenged in this complaint. But
these standards should not be supplied by judicial extension of § 10b and Rule 10b-5
to 'cover the corporate universe."' Id. at 479-80.
" Id. at 477-78. Speaking of the congressional intent in enacting the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the Court said: "[T]he Court repeatedly has described the
'fundamental purpose' of the Act as implementing a 'philosophy of full disclosure';
once full and fair disclosure has occurred, the fairness of the terms of the transaction
is at most a tangential concern of the statute." Id.
Id. at 478.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262 (1974 & Supp. 1977).
" See McBride, Delaware Corporate Law: Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers-The Aft-
ermath of Singer v. The Magnavox Co., 33 Bus. LAw. 2231 (1978).
" There has been some belief that due to the competitive position states find
themselves in for corporate business, it is too much to expect any one state or group
of states to tighten their standards for regulating the conduct of management or con-
trolling interests. See Folk, State Statutes: Their Role in Prescribing Norms of Respon-
sible Management Conduct, 31 Bus. LAw. 1031 (1976). This belief no doubt helps foster
support for additional federal legislation to regulate the conduct of corporate manage-
ment such as the proposals for the federal chartering of the larger public issue corpora-
tions or the enactment of a federal minimum standards act. See Schwartz, A Case for
Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 Bus. LAw. 1125 (Special Issue, Feb. 1976)
(federal chartering); Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (proposal for a Federal Corporate Uniformity Act).
"1 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
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plished solely for the purpose of cashing-out minority share-
holders was a violation of the fiduciary duty owed by the major-
ity to the minority.2 In Singer, North American Phillips Corpo-
ration had determined to acquire control of The Magnavox
Company and had incorporated North American Phillips De-
velopment Corporation for the purpose of having it make a
tender offer for the Magnavox common shares. 3 The board of
directors of Magnavox at first opposed the tender offer because
of a claimed inadequacy in the price being offered but later
withdrew their opposition to the tender offer when the offered
price was increased and certain other modifications were made
in the arrangement. 4 With the opposition of Magnavox re-
moved, Development Corporation acquired 84.1% of the Mag-
navox outstanding common stock. 5 Development Corporation
then brought about the creation of T.M.C. Development Cor-
poration to achieve its purpose of acquiring all equity interest
in Magnavox by means of a merger of The Magnavox Company
with T.M.C. Development Corporation. The directors of Mag-
navox unanimously approved the merger as did the requisite
statutory majority of the shareholders of Magnavox at a special
meeting called for the purpose of voting on the plan of merger
and the merger was thus accomplished. 7
Singer brought a suit to have the merger between T.M.C.
and Magnavox nullified and to recover damages claiming that
"the merger was fraudulent in that it did not serve any busi-
ness purpose other than the forced removal of public minority
shareholders from an equity position in Magnavox at a grossly
inadequate price to enable North American, through Develop-
ment, to obtain the sole ownership of Magnavox.""5 Defendants
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the merger
provisions of the Delaware General Corporation Law were fully
12 Id. at 980.
,3 Id. at 971.
' Id. In addition to agreement for an increase in the offering price, there was
agreement that two-year employment contracts would be provided for sixteen officers
of Magnavox at existing salary levels. Id.
95 Id.
, Id.
7 d. at 972. The success of the merger was assured since Development Corpora-
tion held enough stock in Magnavox to provide the required statutory vote. Id.
99 Id.
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complied with,99 and that the exclusive remedy under Delaware
law for dissatisfaction with a merger was the appraisal rem-
edy.10 The court of chancery granted the motion to dismiss,
stating that a merger was not to be deemed fraudulent merely
because its only purpose was to eliminate minority sharehold-
ers.101 The Supreme Court of Delaware disagreed with this posi-
tion and reversed the decision."0 ' The supreme court held that,
while cashing-out minority shareholders through the merger
process may not constitute fraudulent conduct, it nevertheless
results in breach of the fiduciary obligations which majority
shareholders owe the minority under Delaware law when a
merger is accomplished with no valid business purpose. 0 3 Ac-
It Id.
,0 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 980. Plaintiffs had also challenged the merger as violative of the antifraud
provisions of the Delaware Securities Act in that the proxy material relating to the
merger contained false and misleading statements and omissions. Id. The supreme
court affirmed the position of the court of chancery that plaintiffs were not entitled to
relief under the Delaware Securities Act on the ground that there were insufficient
Delaware contacts to make the Delaware act applicable and the mere fact that the
company was incorporated in Delaware was not enough. Id. at 981. The court of
chancery had based its decision rejecting the Securities Act claim on the fact that
Development Corporation owned enough stock in Magnavox to carry the merger with-
out the vote of the remaining shareholders. Any false statements or omissions in the
proxy material could not therefore have influenced the accomplishment of the merger
and the necessary causal connection between the proxy materials and the merger
would be missing. Id. Federal courts have divided on this issue of causal relationship
under rule 14a-9 of the federal proxy rules. For a position similar to the court of
chancery's in Singer, see Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 770-74 (S.D.N.Y.
1965). Compare, however, the case of Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356
(E.D.N.Y. 1966), in which the court held that a sufficient causal relationship between
the proxy solicitation and a merger might be found even where management controlled
enough shares to approve the transaction. The Supreme Court of the United States
left this issue open in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 n.7 (1970), since
in that case the merger involved could not be carried out without approval by a
substantial number of the minority shareholders.
10 380 A.2d at 980. A similar result has been reached in a recent decision by the
Supreme Court of Indiana under the Indiana certification procedure. Gabhart v. Gab-
hart, 370 N.E.2d 345 (Ind. 1977). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had
certified to the Supreme Court of Indiana the question whether, in a situation where
the merger provisions of Indiana law had been complied with, minority shareholders
in a merging company could attack the merger on the ground that it was not motivated
by a valid business purpose. The Supreme Court of Indiana replied:
We, therefore, hold that in a bona fide merger proceeding, a dissenting
or nonvoting shareholder is limited to the means provided by statute for the
realization of his equity. But we further hold that a proposed merger which
1978-79]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
cordingly, the court said:
We hold, therefore, that a § 251 merger [long-form
merger], made for the sole purpose of freezing out minority
stockholders, is an abuse of the corporate process; and the
complaint, which so alleges in this suit, states a cause of
action for violation of a fiduciary duty for which the Court
may grant such relief as it deems appropriate under the cir-
cumstances."4
The decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Singer
has no valid purpose, which we construe to mean a purpose intended to
advance a corporate interest, and which merger would eliminate or reduce a
minority shareholder's equity, may be challenged, as a de facto dissolution,
by shaieholders entitled to vote upon an issue of dissolution. Such sharehold-
ers may enjoin a dissolution to be effected by procedures other than those
provided by statute for that purpose.
Id. at 356.
1 380 A.2d at 980. The merger in Singer was accomplished under the Delaware
long-form merger statute. However, in Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977),
the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the "business purpose" test of the Singer
case applied as well to short-form mergers. Chancellor Marvel noted the earlier Dela-
ware short-form merger case of Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 187 A.2d 78 (Del.
1962), in which the court had held that the plaintiff's statutory remedy of appraisal
was exclusive in a contest as to value received by minority shareholders in a short-form
merger. However. Chancellor Marvel did not believe that the Stauffer case precluded
him from granting the injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs in Kemp in view of the
attitude displayed by the Supreme Court of Delaware as to majority-minority relations
in its recent opinions such as Singer. 381 A.2d at 245. As to this he was probably
justified, although it is true there were some rather far-reaching statements made by
the court in Stauffer which could be construed as inconsistent with the position of the
court in Singer. For example, in Stauffer the court said:
flit is difficult to imagine a case under the short merger statute in
which there could be such actual fraud as would entitle a minority to set
aside the merger. This is so because the very purpose of the statute is to
provide the parent corporation with a means of eliminating the minority
shareholder's interest in the enterprise. Thereafter the former stockholder
has only a monetary claim. The power of the parent corporation to eliminate
the minority is a complete answer to plaintiff's charge of breach of
trust. ...
187 A.2d at 80. In Singer the court distinguished the Stauffer case as a "value" case
rather than a "freeze-out" case. Furthermore, the court in Singer may have indirectly
counteracted the quoted language from Stauffer when it said, in relation to two other
earlier Delaware cases containing language possibly inconsistent with its opinion in
Singer, that "[any statement therein which seems to be in conflict with what is said
herein must be deemed overruled." 380 A.2d at 979. For further recognition by the
Delaware Court of Chancery that the Singer doctrine should be deemed applicable to
both short-form and long-form mergers in Delaware, see Najjar v. Roland Int'l Corp.,
387 A.2d 709 (Del. Ch. 1978).
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may have been, in part at least, a response to the position of
the Supreme Court of the United States, voiced in the Green
case' 5 and other recent cases,"'8 that federal law should not
entrench on the domain traditionally occupied by state law
except where the federal remedy is clearly intended by Con-
gress.'"' Thus, the Singer decision could be considered as an
attempt by the Delaware Supreme Court to strengthen the
fiduciary standards applicable to majority-minority share-
holder relations, long considered to be one of the prime func-
tions of state corporation law."08 The key to the Singer decision,
of course, was the lack of a valid business purpose for the
merger."0 9 Obviously, therefore, the content given to the term
"business purpose" will determine the extent to which Singer
will afford protection to the minority from oppressive conduct
by the majority."10 If the requirement for a valid business pur-
pose can be satisfied by business reasons related to the inter-
ests of the majority, then Singer could become an empty vic-
tory for the minority.'
10 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
'0 See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
"1 380 A.2d at 976 n.6. The case in which the Supreme Court of the United States
first expressed its current attitude in this respect was Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975),
where, in discussing when it was appropriate to imply a private remedy in a statute
that did not expressly provide for one, the Court listed as one of the relevant factors
whether the cause of action was one traditionally relegated to state law in an area
basically the concern of the states. 422 U.S. at 78. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for
the Court, commented on this factor as follows: "Corporations are creatures of state
law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that,
except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with
respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation."
422 U.S. at 84.
'1" 380 A.2d at 980.
Id.
" The court in Singer found it unnecessary to deal with this problem. The court
said:
Plaintiffs contend that a "business purpose" is proper ina merger only
when it serves the interests of the subsidiary corporation; defendants con-
tend, on the other hand, that if any such purpose is relevant, it is only that
of the parent corporation. Since resolution of that question is not necessary
to the disposition of this appeal, and since it was not central in the briefing
and argument, we leave it to another day.
Id. at n.11.
"I The Singer court was not unaware of this possibility. After recognizing that any
inquiry into the business purpose of a merger poses such questions as "Whose
purpose?" or "Whose business?" the court remarked that "if the business purpose of
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This latter possibility has taken on real proportions as the
result of a second Delaware decision, Tanzer v. International
General Industries, Inc.,"2 which came as a sequel to the Singer
case."3 In Tanzer the Supreme Court of Delaware held that a
merger made primarily to advance the business purpose of the
majority shareholder was not a violation of the fiduciary duty
owed by the majority to the minority expressed in Singer."4
The particular business purpose for the merger in Tanzer was
to facilitate long-term financing by the majority shareholder
company. ' The majority shareholder was International Gen-
eral Industries, Inc. (IGI), a Delaware corporation, which
owned 81% of the outstanding common stock in Kliklok Corpo-
ration, also a Delaware corporation. IGI formed KLK Corpora-
tion under Delaware law and proceeded to bring about a merger
of KLK with Kliklok. As a result of the merger, IGI acquired
all of the Klikok stock and the minority shareholders of Klikok
were cashed-out subject to their statutory appraisal remedy.
The court of chancery refused to grant the minority sharehold-
ers of Kliklok injunctive relief."' This was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court of Delaware on appeal."17 The supreme court
stressed the long established rule in Delaware, as well as else-
where, which recognizes the right of a shareholder to vote his
stock so as to further his own interests as long as he does not
the parent (or dominant) corporation should be examined ... minority shareholders
of the subsidiary (or controlled corporation) may have undue difficulty in raising and
maintaining the issue." Id. at 976.
12 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
"' Justice Duffey opened his opinion in the Tanzer case with the following obser-
vations:
In Singer v. Magnavox Company .. , we held that a merger of a Dela-
ware corporation caused by a majority stockholder solely for the purpose of
cashing-out minority stockholders is a violation of a fiduciary duty owed by
the former to the latter. We reserved for another day the question of whether
a merger made primarily to advance the business purpose of the majority
stockholder is a violation of that duty. That question is now ready for deci-
sion in this appeal.
Id. at 1122.
" Id. at 1125.
t The court referred to a finding made by the Chancellor in which he had stated
that "[the principal reason for the merger, and evidently the only reason for the
merger, is to facilitate long term debt financing by IGI.'" Id. at 1124.
"' Id. at 1122.
I1 d. at 1125.
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in doing so violate any duty owed to other shareholders in the
corporation."' Accordingly, said the court, "IGI, as a stock-
holder of Kliklok, had a right to look to its own corporate con-
cerns in determining how to conduct the latter's affairs, includ-
ing a decision to cause it to merge." '
The problem with the Tanzer decision as far as minority
shareholders' interests are concerned would seem to be the
preoccupation of the court with majority shareholder interests
in determining business purpose. Carried to its logical conclu-
sion, such reasoning would make it possible to argue that it
advances the business interests of the majority to rid them-
selves of a minority interest if the majority felt so inclined even
though no other business interest is served. Any such conclu-
sion, however, would mean that the court had gone full circle
back to where the law stood before the Singer decision.'2 On
the other hand, the Tanzer case did leave some glimmer of
hope for minority shareholders. After holding that a merger
made primarily to advance the business purpose of the major-
"' Id. at 1123-24. See generally, 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 2031 (rev. perm. ed. 1976).
"1 379 A.2d at 1124.
1" Such an extreme result seems unlikely, however. In Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382
A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978), the Delaware Court of Chancery refused to allow a parent
corporation to circumvent a provision in its subsidiary's charter requiring 80% ap-
proval for a merger by forming a wholly owned subsidiary of the subsidiary into which
the subsidiary could be merged merely by majority vote despite argument by the
parent corporation that the merger would serve legitimate business purposes. The
court considered the basic purpose behind the merger to be the elimination of minority
interests and the stated business purposes for the merger to be somewhat dubious. Id.
at 1377-78.
The care taken by the court in Young v. Valhi to make sure that the merger was
"legitimate" and not for the purpose of eliminating the minority shareholders is consis-
tent with an admonition given by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Tanzer to trial
courts to scrutinize carefully parent-subsidiary mergers for possible "subterfuge." The
supreme court said:
Although we have stated that IGI is entitled as majority stockholder to
vote its own corporate concerns, it should be clearly noted that IGI's purpose
in causing the Kliklok merger must be bona fide. As a stockholder, IGI need
not sacrifice its own interest in dealing with a subsidiary; but that interest
must not be suspect as a subterfuge, the real purpose of which is to rid itself
of unwanted minority shareholders in the subsidiary. That would be a viola-
tion of Singer and any subterfuge or effort to escape its mandate must be
scrutinized with care and dealt with by the Trial Court.
379 A.2d at 1124.
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ity shareholder was not per se a violation of fiduciary duty, the
court added that nevertheless the majority shareholder must
be prepared to show that it has met its duty of "entire fairness"
to the minority, thus indicating that the merger involved in the
case might still be open to challenge on fairness grounds.
121
One problem with the fairness doctrine under Delaware
law has been the position of the Delaware courts that when a
merger is challenged on the ground of the lack of fairness "the
unfairness must be of such character and must be so clearly
demonstrated as to impel the conclusion that it emanates from
acts of bad faith, or a reckless indifference to the rights of
others interested, rather than from an honest error of judg-
ment." 2 However, the Supreme Court of Delaware has recog-
nized that in the case of parent-subsidiary mergers where con-
trolling interests are involved, the test should be one of "entire
fairness" with the burden on the interested parties to show that
the merger terms were fair to all persons involved.23 Only if this
latter precept is recognized and vigorously applied by state
courts will minority shareholders be protected from having
their equity interests unjustly eliminated in "freeze-out" merg-
ers where, at least, full disclosure has been made to them of the
terms of such mergers.
2
12 Id. at 1125.
'2 Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 32 A.2d 148 (Del. 1943).
I" Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (1952). See Brudney &
Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1376 (1978),
in which the authors suggest that in parent-subsidiary mergers involving payment of
cash to the minority shareholders of the subsidiary, the test of fairness should be
whether the minority shareholders receive a cash payment sufficient to enable them
to reacquire an equivalent proportionate stock interest in the surviving corporation.
"2 In some jurisdictions, courts may find their freedom to police mergers for
"fairness" somewhat restricted because of stipulations in the corporation statute mak-
ing the appraisal remedy exclusive except for unlawful or fraudulent conduct. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 623(k) (McKinney 1963). A similar exclusivity provision has
been added to § 80(d) of the Model Act as a part of extensive revisions to the appraisal
sections of the Model Act adopted by the Committee on Corporate Laws on January
14, 1978. See Conard, Amendments of Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Dis-
senter's Rights (Sections 73, 74, 80, and 81), 33 Bus. LAw. 2587, 2590-91 (1978). If
"fairness" is considered as something separate and apart from unlawfulness or fraud,
then a court's hands would appear to be tied in applying the "entire fairness" concept
expressed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Sterling. However, if in "interested"
mergers, the fiduciary concept makes breach of "entire fairness" by a parent corpora-
tion in its treatment of the minority shareholders of its subsidiary "unlawful conduct,"
[Vol. 67
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B. Director's Right of Inspection
Turning to the more traditional areas of state corporation
law, a recent case from the Missouri Court of Appeals, State
ex rel. Moore v. State Bank of Halsville,125 underscores the
important difference between the director's right to inspect the
corporate books and records and the shareholder's right of
inspection. It has long been said that a director's right of
inspection is absolute and unqualified12 1 whereas the share-
holder's right of inspection is predicated on the inspection's
being for a proper purpose.' 27 While this statement is essen-
tially correct as to the shareholder's right of inspection, 12 it is
then the appraisal remedy would not appear to stand in the way. The comments
accompanying the revision of § 80 of the Model Act suggest this latter possibility. The
comments contain the observation that "[i]f the corporation attempts to carry
through an action. . . in violation of a fiduciary duty the court's freedom to intervene
is unaffected." Conard, supra, at 2596.
',' 561 S.W.2d 722 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
2 See Machen v. Machen & Mayer Electrical Mfg. Co., 85 A. 100 (Pa. 1912).
2' See Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905).
12 In most jurisdictions, the shareholder's right of inspection is now largely statu-
tory. See H. BALLANTtNE, CORPORATIONS § 161 (rev. ed. 1946). Section 52 of the Model
Business Corporation Act provides that where the person making the demand has
owned his stock for at least six months or owns at least five percent of all the outstand-
ing shares of the corporation, he has a right to examine the books and records of the
corporation for any proper purpose at any reasonable time or times by making written
demand stating the purpose of the inspection. ABA-ALI MODEL BusiNESS CORPORATION
Aar § 52 (rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as MODEL Ac]. Comments in the annota-
tions to the Model -Act state that "[ilf a shareholder meets either the time or percen-
tage of holding requirements and has stated a proper purpose in his written demand
he is entitled to inspect all relevant books unless an improper purpose can be shown."
2 MODEL BusiNEss CORPORATION ACr ANNOTATED § 52 2 (2d ed. 1971). This would
appear to put the burden of proof on the corporation to show improper purpose. On
the other hand, a further provision in § 52 of the Model Act stipulates that regardless
of the period of time during which a shareholder may hdve held his stock and regardless
of the nurpber of shares held by him, a court upon proof of proper purpose may order
examination of the books and records of the corporation. MODEL ACT § 52 (third
paragraph). Under these circumstances the burden of proof would appear to be on the
shareholders to show proper purpose.
The Kentucky Business Corporation Act, which was adopted in 1972, and which
constitutes a substantial adoption of the Model Business Corporation Act, has tight-
ened somewhat the shareholder inspection requirements. Where inspection is sought
as a matter of right by a shareholder who meets the time and ownership requirements,
the Kentucky Act provides that as a condition to being given such right of inspection,
the shareholder can be required by the corporation to furnish an affidavit that the
inspection is desired for a proper purpose, that he has not within two years sold or
offered for sale any list of shareholders of such corporation or any other corporation,
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
not entirely correct in relation to the director's right of inspec-
tion, as some jurisdictions have denied the right if the direc-
tor's motives are shown to be improper. 2 The Missouri court
in the Moore case, while allowing the desired inspection to be
made, took this possible qualification into account.
In Moore, the State Bank of Hallsville had been chartered
as a state bank under the laws of Missouri. Moore, a certified
public accountant, having acquired ownership of capital stock
in the bank and having been elected to the board of directors
of the bank, made repeated requests to be allowed access to the
books and records of the bank but was in all cases refused.
Later, Moore was given permission to inspect the stock register
or transfer book and the minute book of the board. Not being
satisfied with this, Moore brought suit to enforce by mandamus
a broader right of inspection. The bank and Mottaz, its presi-
dent and majority shareholder, agreed to a stipulation that
would give Moore access to all books and records made subse-
quent to his becoming a board member. However, Moore
sought access also to the books and records reflecting corporate
activities prior to his election to the board. He therefore contin-
ued to pursue his mandamus suit. The trial court issued a writ
of mandamus directing the bank and Mottaz to give Moore full
access to the books and records of the bank.3 '
On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court and treated the writ of mandamus
as properly issued.'31 The court recognized the need for giving
directors free access to corporate books and records to enable
them to discharge their fiduciary duties in managing the corpo-
ration. 32 However, the court added that when the right of
inspection is sought to be enforced by mandamus "the court
may temper the absolute right by conditions to avoid unreason-
able or oppressive interference or disruption of corporate busi-
that he has not aided or abetted any person in procuring any list of shareholders for
any such purpose, and that he has not improperly used any information secured
through any prior examination of the books and records of such corporation or any
other corporation. Ky. REv. STAT. § 271A.260 (Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
I State ex rel. Paschall v. Scott, 247 P.2d 543 (Wash. 1952).
, 561 S.W.2d at 723.
,' Id. at 725.
"' Id. at 724-25.
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ness.' ' 33 The court said that a presumption exists that a direc-
tor seeks inspection of corporate books and records in good
faith and with honesty of purpose and that those challenging
such presumption in a mandamus suit to enforce inspection
rights must bear the burden of proof of overcoming the pre-
sumption. 34 Since the bank and Mottaz had "failed to intro-
duce evidence of any kind that Moore's desire to inspect the
Bank's books and records was motivated by any improper rea-
son,'135 or "that his inspection would result in any unreason-
able or disruptive interference with the Bank's business or
would be harmful to the interests of the stockholders,' ' 36 the
court concluded that the trial court had acted within its discre-
tion in issuing the writ of mandamus.' 37
Neither the courts nor the commentators have agreed on
whether improper motive should serve as a qualification to a
director's right of inspection,' 3 but as Dean Stevens once said,
"his attempt to secure information for a personal or ulterior
purpose and in violation of his obligation to the shareholders
should be an obvious ground for denying him access to the
information he desires."'39 This viewpoint found expression in
a leading Delaware case, State ex rel. Farber v. Seiberling Rub-
ber Co.,' 4 in which a director of Seiberling Rubber Co. brought
an action in mandamus to secure access to the corporate stock
ledger. The court held his demand could be refused if improper
motive were established. " ' The court said that a director's right
of inspection of corporate books and records exists only so long
"' Id. at 725.
13 Id.
133 Id.
13 Id.
137 Id.
I's Professor George D. Hornstein of the New York bar, commenting on court
decisions which had refused inspection where directors were acting against the best
interests of the corporation, voiced the opinion that such decisions might lead to a
serious undermining of the conscientious director's right of inspection. He urged that
"[iun place of this collateral impeachment of the director, the normal corporate rem-
edy against a director who is guilty of gross abuse of office should be removal from
office." G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 421, at 523 (1959).
"I R. STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 109, at 497 (2d ed. 1949) (footnote omitted).
Accord, H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 165 (rev. ed. 1946).
1" 168 A.2d 310 (Del. 1961).
"' Id. at 312.
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as his purpose is not in derogation of the interests of the corpo-
ration. 1 2 The court reasoned persuasively that since the pur-
pose of making the director's right of inspection absolute is to
enable the director to discharge his fiduciary obligations to the
corporation, it would be inconsistent to recognize such an abso-
lute right when the avowed purpose of the inspection is hostile
to the interests of the corporation. 1 3 There would thus appear
to be considerable merit to the approach taken by the Missouri
Court of Appeals in Moore in treating the writ of mandamus
as giving the court discretion to temper the absolute right of
inspection on the part of directors to allow for dishonesty of
purpose and improper motive."'
C. Tender Offers
Finally, at the state level, perhaps the case with the great-
est potential impact on state law arising during the period
covered by the present survey was Great Western United Corp.
v. Kidwell,145 in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held the Idaho takeover statute unconstitutional under the
supremacy 4 ' and commerce clauses"' of the United States
Constitution.
The constitutionality of state takeover statutes had long
been in question since the first such state statutes appeared in
the late 1960's.111 The issue finally burst into the open when
Great Western United Corporation, a Delaware corporation
with its major business offices in Dallas, Texas, filed a suit in
the federal district court for the Northern District of Texas to
prevent state officials in Idaho from asserting jurisdiction over
Great Western's tender offer for shares of Sunshine Mining and
Metal Co., a Washington corporation with its principal execu-
li2 Id.
1 Id.
"I See generally, 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPsDI OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORTIONS
§ 2235 (rev. perm. ed. 1976).
"' 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978).
'" U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
"7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
I" See Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 687 (1975);
Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitution-
ality, 45 FORD. L. REv. 1 (1976).
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tive office in Idaho.'49 Great Western had filed a Schedule 13D
with the Securities and Exchange Commission as required by
the Commission under the Williams Act governing corporate
tender offers at the federal level.' However, the Idaho takeover
law also by its terms applied to Great Western's offer since the
target company, Sunshine, although incorporated in the State
of Washington, was a company with its principal office in Idaho
and with substantial assets located in the state.' Great West-
ern made an effort to comply with the Idaho law by filing
required documents with the Idaho Commissioner of Fi-
nance. 152 Nevertheless, the Director of the Idaho Department of
Finance raised numerous objections to the disclosures con-
tained in the documents so filed and summarily ordered a
delay in the effective date of the Idaho registration statement
pending suggested amendments. 3 At about the same time,
two other states, New York and Maryland, indicated that they
might also assert jurisdiction over Great Western's offer for
Sunshine.5 4 Faced with the delays which compliance with
these several possibly conflicting state takeover statutes might
bring, Great Western brought its suit to have these state laws
declared invalid as applied to interstate cash tender offers for
the purchase of securities traded on a national securities ex-
change.'55
The district court determined that it could properly assert
jurisdiction over the New York and Idaho officials but dis-
missed the claim against the Maryland officials because of lack
of sufficient indication by the Maryland officials that they in-
tended to enforce the Maryland statute against Great West-
ern. 156 Later, the district court also dismissed the case against
" Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
I 577 F.2d at 1262-63. Schedule 13D, the original disclosure form prescribed by
the Commission for use in making tender offers, has been replaced by Schedule 14D-
1. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (1978).
IDAHO Cone § 30-1501(6) (Supp. 1978).
"s 577 F.2d at 1263.
's Id. at 1263-64.
m Id. at 1264.
I Id.
IN Id. The district judge had at first issued a temporary restraining order directing
the officials of the three states not to assert jurisdiction over the Great Western tender
offer but the court of appeals stayed this order and directed the district court to make
findings of jurisdiction before deciding the merits of the case. Id.
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the New York officials as moot because these officials had in-
formed Great Western by letter that they had decided not to
assert jurisdiction over Great Western's offer for Sunshine.5 7
Proceeding to a consideration of the Idaho Takeover Act on the
merits the district court held that the Idaho statute had been
preempted by the Williams Act and violated the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution.58 This decision was
affirmed on the merits by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.'59
In regard to preemption, the Director of the Idaho Depart-
ment of Finance argued that Congress in section 28 of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 had specifically preserved the
jurisdiction of states over securities issues so long as state ac-
tion did not conflict with the provisions of the federal act,6 0
and that a conflict would exist only if it were impossible to
meet both federal and state requirements.'61 The court rejected
this narrow approach to what constitutes a "conflict" between
federal and state requirements, taking the position that
whether a conflict exists must be determined by considering
whether the requirements of the state law infringe on the un-
derlying purpose of the federal law.'62 Using this test, the court
noted that the underlying purpose of the Williams Act, as em-
phasized by the Supreme Court of the United States in Piper
v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,"6 3 was the protection of investors
13 Id.
x Id.
'5, Id. at 1287. Before considering the merits of the case, the court of appeals dealt
extensively with whether it could properly assert jurisdiction over the Idaho state
officials and whether venue was proper in the Northern District of Texas. In holding
that the requirements of jurisdiction and venue were met, the court said:
Personal jurisdiction existed under the Texas long arm statute, as made
applicable by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the requirements of
due process. Personal jurisdiction also existed by virtue of § 27 of the 1934
Act. Venue is proper under both § 27 of the 1934 Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
Id. at 1274.
10 Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commis-
sion (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any
security of any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of
this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976).
" 577 F.2d at 1275.
6 Id. at 1274-76.
66 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
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and that Congress had relied upon a "market approach" to
accomplish this purpose "by allowing both the offeror and the
incumbent managers of a target company to present fully their
arguments and then to let the investor decide for himself."' 6
By contrast, the court observed, the Idaho law through its pre-
filing requirements,"5 and public hearing provisions,'6 had the
effect of placing investor protection in the hands of target com-
pany management. 6' Without deciding whether the true pur-
pose of the Idaho takeover law was to protect investors or pro-
tect incumbent management, the court concluded that
"Idaho's 'fiduciary approach' to investor protection may be one
way to protect shareholders, but it is an approach Congress
rejected." 6 '
In considering the validity of the Idaho takeover statute
under the commerce clause,'69 the court adopted as its test the
general rule laid down by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 7' In the Pike case, the
Supreme Court said that the general rule which had emerged
for determining the validity of state statutes affecting inter-
state commerce was that "[w]here the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and
its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."'' Applying
the Pike test, the court of appeals in Kidwell held that, al-
though there might be legitimate local interests served by the
'" 577 F.2d at 1276 (footnote omitted). The Senate Committee Report accompa-
nying the Williams Bill when it was favorably reported to Congress said:
The Committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the balance of
regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person making
the takeover bid. The bill is designed to require full disclosure for the benefit
of investors while at the same time providing the offeror and management
equal opportunity to fairly present their case.
S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1968).
"' IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(1)-(2) (Supp. 1978).
.. IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(4) (Supp. 1978).
1" 577 F.2d at 1278.
I, Id. at 1279 (footnote omitted).
"' For a general discussion of the validity of state takeover statutes under the
commerce clause, see Note, Commerce Clause Limitations upon State Regulation of
Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133 (1974).
17, 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
17' Id. at 142.
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Idaho takeover law,' 72 the burdens which the takeover law
placed on interstate commerce far outweighed the legitimate
benefits the takeover law provided,' 7 particularly since only
about two percent of Sunshine's shareholders resided in
Idaho' 74 and the effect of the action by the Idaho officials was
to stop a tender offer that involved over thirty-one million dol-
lars of interstate business.' 7 As the court observed: "The Idaho
legislature, through its extraterritorial law, made the entire
country its laboratory. The takeover statute had extensive, de-
liberate, and foreseeable effects on transactions having only a
minimal connection with Idaho. ' ''
71
Since many state takeover statutes, including the recently
adopted Kentucky takeover statute, 77 are similar to the Idaho
statute, these state takeover statutes will probably suffer a
similar fate if the Kidwell decision holds up.'78 Such a conse-
quence would suggest the need for either a complete preemp-
tion by Congress of tender offer legislation as it relates to the
larger national companies, 'T or a substantial reworking of state
tender offer laws to lessen their extraterritorial impact"0 and
their present tendency to be overprotective of incumbent man-
agement.' 1
172 577 F.2d at 1282-83. The court referred to such legitimate local interests as
protection of Idaho investors and protection of a benevolent incumbent management
committed to a policy of good corporate citizenship from ouster by outside interests.
Id. The court, however, rejected as a permissible purpose the attempt to use a takeover
law as a means of preventing the removal of local businesses to other states. Id. at 1282.
I" Id. at 1286.
171 Id. at 1283.
,T' Id. at 1284, 1286.
,' Id. at 1287.
"u KRS § 292.560-.630 (Supp. 1978).
,7s See comments by Robert M. Royalty, Panel Moderator at the "Blue Sky Law-
yers Forum" held during the 61st Annual Conference of the North American Securities
Administrators Association. SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 471 (Sept. 27, 1978) at
A-15.
,7, See Moylan, supra note 148, at 699-702. See also E. ARANow, H. EINHORN, &
G. BERLsTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 228 (1977),
in which the authors state that they "believe that, logically, state tender offer statutes
are and should be preempted by federal legislation." (Footnote omitted).
,s The proposed Federal Securities Code would preempt state regulation of tender
offers unless the target company's principal place of business is located within the state
and more than 50% of the voting shareholders holding more than 50% of such stock
reside in the state. ALl FED. SEC. CODE § 1904(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
Il See comments by Harold M. Williams, Chairman of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, at the 61st Annual Conference of the North American Securities
Administrators Association. SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 470 (Sept. 20, 1978) at
A-15 & A-16.
